船木研究室出身の研究者


上條良夫(Yoshio Kamijo 早稲田大学教授、経済学博士)研究業績など

竹内あい(Ai Takeuchi 立命館大学准教授、経済学博士)研究業績など

近郷匠(Takumi Kongo 福岡大学教授、経済学博士)研究業績など

我妻靖(Yasushi Agatsuma 関西学院大学商学部助教、経済学博士)紹介
出版論文:
[1] Koji, Yokote, Yasushi Agatsuma and Yukihiko Funaki,(2017) "Random Reduction Consistency of the Weber Set, the Core and the Anti-Core," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,  Volume 85, Issue 3, pp.389–405, DOI:10.1007/s00186-017-0575-3.
[2] Agatsuma, Y., (2016) "Testable implications of the core in TU market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 64, pp.23-29
Discussion papers:
[1] Agatsuma, Y. (2016) "Testable implications of no envy allocations," mimeo.
[2] Agatsuma, Y., Funaki, Y., Yokote, K., (2014) "Random reduction consistency of the Weber set and the core," Waseda Economics Working Paper Series, 14-001, pp.1-13
[3] Agatsuma, Y., Inoue, Y., Shirai, K., (2013) "Testable implications of potential games," Waseda Economics Working Paper Series, 13-003, pp.1-9

宇都伸之(Nobuyuki Uto 松本大学専任講師)研究業績など

劉水歌(Suige Liu 早稲田大学講師, EpiCenterメンバー(Maastricht Univeristy),経済学博士
[1]Takaaki Abe and Shuige Liu, "Monotonic Core Allocation Paths for 
Assignment Games," Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming, 2019
[2] Shuige Liu, “Directed Graphical Structure, Nash Equilibrium, and Potential Games”, Operations Research Letters 46 (2018), 273-277.
[3] Mamoru Kaneko and Shuige Liu, “Elimination of Dominated Strategies and Inessential Players”, Operations Research and Decisions 25: 33-54, 2015.
Discussion papers:
[1] Shuige Liu, Characterizing Perfect and Proper Rationalizabilities by Lexicographic Epistemic Model with Incomplete Information", WINPEC Working Paper Series, No.E1721,  Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2017.
[2] Shuige Liu, "Characterizing permissibility and proper rationalizability by incomplete information," EPICENTER working paper series No.14, Maastricht Univeristy, 2018.
[3] Shuige Liu, "Characterizing assumption of rationality by incomplete information," EPICENTER working paper series No.15, Maastricht Univeristy, 2018.

横手康二(Kojo Yokote 早稲田大学高等研究所研究員,経済学博士) 研究業績
[1] Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote and Yukihiko Funaki, "Redistribution to the less productive: Parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values," Theory and Decision91, 81-98, 2021 
[2] Koji Yokote, "On optimal taxes and subsidies: A discrete saddle-point theorem with application to job matching under constraints," Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 5(1), 37-77, 2020
[3] Koji Yokote, "The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 275, 134–143, 2020.
[4 Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote and Yukihiko Funaki, "Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games," to appear in Social Choice and Welfare, 2019.
[5] Yokote, Koji, Takumi Kongo  and Yukihiko Funaki, "The balanced contributions property for equal contributors," Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 108, pp. 113-124, March 2018.
[6] Yokote, Koji, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo, “Coincidence of the Shapley Value with Other Solutions Satisfying Covariance,” Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 89, pp.1-9, September 2017.
[7] Yokote, Koji, Yasushi Agatsuma and Yukihiko Funaki, "Random Reduction Consistency of the Weber Set, the Core and the Anti-Core," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,  Volume 85, Issue 3, pp.389–405, June 2017. DOI:10.1007/s00186-017-0575-3.Research,doi:10.1007/s00186-017-0575-3, 2017
[8] Casajus, A., & Yokote, K. Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Theory, 167, 274-284, 2017
[9] Yokote, K., & Casajus, A. Weak differential monotonicity, flat tax, and basic income.Economics Letters, 151, 100-103, 2017
[10] Yokote Koji  and Yukihiko Funaki, "Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp.171–203, June 2017. DOI 10.1007/s00355-017-1056-6. 
[11] Yokote, K., & Kongo, T. The balanced contributions property for symmetric players.Operations Research Letters, 45, 3, 227-231, 2017
[12] Yokote, K. Core and competitive equilibria: An approach from discrete convex analysis.Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66, 1-13, 2016
[13] Yokote, K. Weighted values and the core in NTU games. International Journal of Game Theory 46, 631-654, 2017. doi:10.1007/s00182-016-0550-x.
[14] Yokote, K., Funaki, Y., & Kamijo, Y. A new basis and the Shapley value. Mathematical Social Sciences, 80, 21-24, 2016
[15] Yokote, K. Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value.International Journal of Game Theory, 44(2), 275-293, 2015 

阿部貴晃(Takaaki Abe 早稲田大学助教、経済学博士) CV
[1]Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, Taro Shinoda "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation," GAMES, 12(3), 64, 2021; open access https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064
[2]Takaaki Abe,Yukihiko Funaki,"The Unbinding Core for Coalitional Form Games," Mathematical Social Sciences, 113:39-42, 2021 [doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007]
[3]Takaaki Abe,Yukihiko Funaki, "The Projective Core of Symmetric Games with Externalities ," International Journal of Game Theory 50:167-183, 2021 [doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00745-x]
[4]Takaaki Abe,Stability and Values for Games with Coalition Structures, Economics Letters 200:109750, 2021 [doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109750]
[5]Takaaki Abe,"Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach," GAMES 12:14, 2021 [doi:10.3390/g12010014]
[6]Takaaki Abe, "Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Games with Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory 49:97-117, 2020 [doi:10.1007/s00182-019-00675-3]
[7]Takaaki Abe, "Axiomatizations of Coalition Aggregation Functions," Mathematical Social Sciences 103:69-75, 2020 [doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.12.001]
[8] Takaaki Abe and Shuige Liu, "Monotonic Core Allocation Paths for 
Assignment Games," Social Choice and Welfare 53:557-573, 2019 [doi:10.1007/s00355-019-01197-3]
[9]Takaaki Abe, "Decomposing a Balanced Game: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Nonemptiness of the Core," Economics Letters, forthcoming, 2018
[10] Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada, "The Weighted-egalitarian Shapley Values," Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming, 2018.
[11]Takaaki Abe, "Stable Coalition Structures in Symmetric Majority Games: A Coincidence between Myopia and Farsightedness," Theory and Decision, Forthcoming, 2018.
[12]Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada, "Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-based Allocation and Weighted Division," International Game Theory Review 19(4), 2017.
[13]Takaaki Abe, "Consistency and the Core in Games with Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory  47(1):1-22
DOI:10.1007/s00182-017-0581-y, 2018
[14]Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, "The Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game," International Journal of Game Theory, 46, pp.715-736, 2017.

篠田太郎(Taro Shinoda 早稲田大学助手)
[1]Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, Taro Shinoda "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation," Games, 12(3), 64; open access https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064, 2021

中川彩野(Ayano Nakagawa 早稲田大学大学院経済学研究科博士課程学生)
[1]中川彩野「複数キーワードオークションにおける均衡分析―2 人の広告主の入札値が同じケース―」『日本オペレーションズリサーチ学会論誌』、第64巻掲載決定、2021年

松八重泰介(Taisuke Matsubae 中央大学助教,経済学博士) 研究業績など


-----学部卒業者
篠潤之介(Junnosuke Shino 早稲田大学国際教養学部准教授、Ph.D.) 研究業績など

吉見憲二(Kenji Yoshimi 成蹊大学経営学部准教授、博士(国際情報通信学))  ツイッター