船木研究室出身の研究者


上條良夫(Yoshio Kamijo 高知工科大学教授、経済学博士)研究業績など

竹内あい(Ai Takeuchi 立命館大学准教授、経済学博士)研究業績など

近郷匠(Takumi Kongo 福岡大学教授、経済学博士)研究業績など

我妻靖(Yasushi Agatsuma 首都大学東京経済経営学部助教)紹介
出版論文:
[1] Koji, Yokote, Yasushi Agatsuma and Yukihiko Funaki,(2017) "Random Reduction Consistency of the Weber Set, the Core and the Anti-Core," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,  Volume 85, Issue 3, pp.389–405, DOI:10.1007/s00186-017-0575-3.
[2] Agatsuma, Y., (2016) "Testable implications of the core in TU market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 64, pp.23-29
Discussion papers:
[1] Agatsuma, Y. (2016) "Testable implications of no envy allocations," mimeo.
[2] Agatsuma, Y., Funaki, Y., Yokote, K., (2014) "Random reduction consistency of the Weber set and the core," Waseda Economics Working Paper Series, 14-001, pp.1-13
[3] Agatsuma, Y., Inoue, Y., Shirai, K., (2013) "Testable implications of potential games," Waseda Economics Working Paper Series, 13-003, pp.1-9

宇都伸之(Nobuyuki Uto 北陸大学助教)研究業績など

劉水歌(Suige Liu 早稲田大学講師, EpiCenterメンバー(Maastricht Univeristy),経済学博士
出版論文:
[1]Takaaki Abe and Shuige Liu, "Monotonic Core Allocation Paths for 
Assignment Games," Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming, 2019[2] Shuige Liu, “Directed Graphical Structure, Nash Equilibrium, and Potential Games”, Operations Research Letters 46 (2018), 273-277.
[3] Kaneko and Shuige Liu, “Elimination of Dominated Strategies and Inessential Players”, Operations Research and Decisions 25: 33-54, 2015.
Discussion papers:
[1] Shuige Liu, Characterizing Perfect and Proper Rationalizabilities by Lexicographic Epistemic Model with Incomplete Information", WINPEC Working Paper Series, No.E1721,  Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2017.
[2] Shuige Liu, "Characterizing permissibility and proper rationalizability by incomplete information," EPICENTER working paper series No.14, Maastricht Univeristy, 2018.
[3] Shuige Liu, "Characterizing assumption of rationality by incomplete information," EPICENTER working paper series No.15, Maastricht Univeristy, 2018.

横手康二(Kojo Yokote 早稲田大学高等研究所研究員,経済学博士) CV
出版論文:
[1]  Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote and Yukihiko Funaki, "Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games," to appear in Social Choice and Welfare, 2019.
[2] Yokote Koji, Takumi Kongo  and Yukihiko Funaki, "The balanced contributions property for equal contributors," Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 108, pp. 113-124, March 2018.[3] Yokote Koji, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo, “Coincidence of the Shapley Value with Other Solutions Satisfying Covariance,” Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 89, pp.1-9, September 2017.
[4] Yokote Koji, Yasushi Agatsuma and Yukihiko Funaki, "Random Reduction Consistency of the Weber Set, the Core and the Anti-Core," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,  Volume 85, Issue 3, pp.389–405, June 2017. DOI:10.1007/s00186-017-0575-3.Research,doi:10.1007/s00186-017-0575-3, 2017
[5] Casajus, A., & Yokote, K. Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Theory, 167, 274-284, 2017
[6] Yokote, K., & Casajus, A. Weak differential monotonicity, flat tax, and basic income.Economics Letters, 151, 100-103, 2017
[7] Yokote Koji  and Yukihiko Funaki, "Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp.171–203, June 2017. DOI 10.1007/s00355-017-1056-6. 
[8] Yokote, K., & Kongo, T. The balanced contributions property for symmetric players.Operations Research Letters, 45, 3, 227-231, 2017
[9] Yokote, K. Core and competitive equilibria: An approach from discrete convex analysis.Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66, 1-13, 2016
[10] Yokote, K. Weighted values and the core in NTU games. International Journal of Game Theory 46, 631-654, 2017. doi:10.1007/s00182-016-0550-x.
[11] Yokote, K., Funaki, Y., & Kamijo, Y. A new basis and the Shapley value. Mathematical Social Sciences, 80, 21-24, 2016
[12] Yokote, K. Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value.International Journal of Game Theory, 44(2), 275-293, 2015 
Discussion papers:
[1] Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki, Yoshio Kamijo, ‘‘Relationship between the Shapley value and other solution concepts,’’ WINPEC  Working Paper  No. E1304, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2013
[2] Yasushi Agatsuma, Yukihiko Funaki, Koji Yokote, ‘‘Random reduction consistency of Weber set and the core,’’ Graduate School of Economics, Waseda Univeristy Working Paper Series, No. 14-001, 2014
[3] Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki, ‘‘Several bases of a game space and an application to the Shapley value,’’  WINPEC  Working Paper, No. E1419, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2014
[4] Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki, ‘‘Weak Surplus Monotonicity characterizes convex combination of egalitarian Shapley value and Consensus value,’’  WINPEC  Working Paper, No. E1504, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2015


阿部貴晃(Takaaki Abe 早稲田大学助教) CV
出版論文
[1] Takaaki Abe and Shuige Liu, "Monotonic Core Allocation Paths for 
Assignment Games," Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming, 2019
[2]Takaaki Abe, "Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Games with 
Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming, 2019
[3]Takaaki Abe, "Decomposing a Balanced Game: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Nonemptiness of the Core," Economics Letters, forthcoming, 2018
[4] Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada, "The Weighted-egalitarian Shapley Values," Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming, 2018.
[5]Takaaki Abe, "Stable Coalition Structures in Symmetric Majority Games: A Coincidence between Myopia and Farsightedness," Theory and Decision, Forthcoming, 2018.
[6]Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada, "Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-based Allocation and Weighted Division," International Game Theory Review 19(4), 2017.
[7]Takaaki Abe, "Consistency and the Core in Games with Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Forthcoming, 2017.
[8]Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, "The Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game," International Journal of Game Theory, 46, pp.715-736, 2017.
Discussion Papers:
[1]Takaaki Abe, "Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Games with Externalities," WINPEC Working Paper Series No. E1722, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2017.
[2]Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada, "Priority-regarding Shapley values," WINPEC Working Paper Series No.E1711,  Waseda Institute of Political Economy, 2017.
[3]Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada, "Monotonic redistribution: Integrating performance-based allocation and equity," WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, No.E1701, 2017.
[4] Abe, "Hedonic Games with Externalties," WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, No.E1612, 2016.
[5]Takaaki Abe, "Efficiency and the Core in Games with Positive and Negative Externalities," WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, No.E1601, 2016.
[6]Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game," WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, No.E1502, 2015.
[7]Takaaki Abe, "Relationship among Solutions Based on Compromise in Cooperative Games," Waseda Economics Working Paper Series, Waseda University Graduate School of Economics, No.15-001, 2015.




松八重泰介(Taisuke Matsubae 中央大学経済研究所研究員,経済学博士) 研究業績など


-----学部卒業者
篠潤之介(Junnosuke Shino 早稲田大学国際教養学部専任講師、Ph.D.) 研究業績など

吉見憲二(Kenji Yoshimi 佛教大学准教授、博士(国際情報通信学))  研究業績など